

Governance of Social Data Verification in the PBI-JKN Program: A Policy Study on the Deactivation of 7.39 million Recipients by the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs

Hashfi Rafdi¹, Muh Fichriyadi Hastira², Muhammad Reza Fahlevy³, Jumansyah⁴, Niken Nurmiyati⁵

^{1,2,3,4,5} Department of Government Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Mulawarman, Samarinda, Indonesia.
Email: hashfiratdi@fisip.unmul.ac.id¹, muhfichriyadihastira@fisip.unmul.ac.id², m.rezafahlevy@fisip.unmul.ac.id³, jumansyah@fisip.unmul.ac.id⁴, nikennurmiyati@fisip.unmul.ac.id⁵

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ABSTRACT

The deactivation of 7.39 million participants in the National Health Insurance Contribution Assistance Program (PBI-JKN) by the Ministry of Social Affairs in early 2025 sparked policy controversy, particularly regarding data accuracy and its impact on vulnerable groups. This study aims to analyze the governance of data verification and the implementation of this policy within the framework of Good Enough Governance proposed by Marlie S. Grindle. Through a case study in Central Java Province—covering Semarang, Demak, and Wonogiri—this research explores how local bureaucratic and fiscal capacity limitations influence responses to central government policies. The results reveal a mismatch between the central government's technocratic approach and the adaptive needs of local areas. While digitalization enhances efficiency, the lack of social sensitivity in implementation risks causing health exclusion. The theory of Good Enough Governance is relevant for evaluating policies contextually and realistically, where reforms do not have to be ideal but sufficiently effective in reaching people with low incomes. The study recommends improvements in data integration, public participation, and policies grounded in social justice. These findings will enrich the discourse on inclusive and adaptive social policy governance amid systemic limitations.

Keywords: Governance, Good Enough Governance, Public Policy, Social Data Verification, PBI-JKN.

I. Introduction

The National Health Insurance Contribution Assistance Program (PBI-JKN) is part of the government's efforts to build an inclusive and socially equitable social security system, as mandated by Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System. This program aims to ensure access to healthcare services for poor and disadvantaged communities, with their premiums paid by the state through a subsidy scheme. In practice, PBI-JKN serves as a crucial tool in promoting the fulfillment of citizens' fundamental rights in the healthcare field, while also serving as an indicator of how effectively the state fulfills its protective role toward its citizens within the framework of a welfare state (Koenti, 2023). However, implementing this program often faces

serious challenges, particularly in data collection and beneficiary validation. One of the structural challenges that continues to arise is the issue of data inconsistency, weak coordination between agencies, and the lack of involvement of local governments in verifying and updating PBI-JKN beneficiary data. (Rosyadi, 2016). The peak of this issue can be seen in the policy of the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, which in 2025 deactivated 7.39 million PBI-JKN recipients on the grounds of incompatibility with the National Integrated Socioeconomic Data (DTSEN) and welfare classifications that are no longer included in deciles 1-5. (detiknews, n.d.) This policy has sparked controversy among the public. On the one hand, this measure reflects efforts to improve the accuracy of evidence-based social assistance targeting using the latest data. However, this decision has created new social exclusion, particularly for affected communities who lack the capacity or access to undergo the reactivation procedure. This highlights the gap between data-driven policy design and the complex and dynamic social reality. In the context of public administration, this phenomenon indicates that governance in social data verification is not yet optimal, particularly regarding transparency, accountability, and public participation (Dwiyanto, 2021).

Data validity is the primary foundation for formulating and implementing fair, effective, and targeted social policies. In Indonesia, issues related to data validity in social assistance programs such as PBI-JKN have become chronic problems that hinder the implementation of evidence-based policymaking. Data errors stemming from the lack of integration in information systems, weak verification capacity at the local level, and inconsistencies in population data updates significantly contribute to the inefficiency of social policies. In the context of PBI-JKN, the failure to provide valid data not only results in budget duplication and leakage but also has the potential to create exclusion errors that deprive citizens of their right to basic health services. (Kulon, n.d.). Therefore, it is important to examine in greater depth how social data verification is managed in the PBI-JKN policy, as well as how the dynamics between actors such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, BPJS, Dukcapil, and local governments influence the implementation and impact of the policy. This research is crucial for evaluating the effectiveness of data-based social policies and proposing policy improvements to make them more responsive to the principles of social justice and good governance values.

One of the fundamental problems in data validity is the weak integration between the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS), now known as DTSEN, and the population data system and data from other sectors, such as BPJS Kesehatan and Dukcapil. This lack of synchronization is exacerbated by the fact that the data updating process often still relies on an administrative approach rather than a community-based participatory approach. Studies show that community involvement in the social data collection process can improve data accuracy by up to 27% compared to a top-down bureaucratic approach. When data is used as a basis for policy decisions but does not reflect the social reality, the policy will lose its social legitimacy and substantial effectiveness. Data validity cannot be separated from the political dimension of data itself. In the governance context, data is not a neutral entity but a product of power relations, negotiations between actors, and institutional capacity to produce and manage information. (Ciborra, 2005). In Indonesia, central agencies' monopoly of data authority without adequate involvement from local governments and civil society leads to inclusive governance and closes the space for social correction. The phenomenon of deactivating 7.39 million PBI-JKN recipients by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2025 reflects a systemic failure in social data validation. Although this measure was motivated by efficiency and targeting accuracy, on-the-ground realities show that many poor and vulnerable individuals are disproportionately affected, as they cannot meet reactivation procedures or are inaccessible during ground-checking processes. This case demonstrates that social data verification governance is not merely a technical issue but also concerns distributive justice and the sensitivity of policies to the social conditions of citizens. (Nurmala Selly Saputri, 2023). Therefore, the challenge ahead is not merely to improve the data information system, but to build collaborative, transparent, and participatory data governance at all levels of government.

The Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in 2025 implemented a policy to rationalize PBI-JKN recipient data by deactivating 7,397,277 participants. This step was based on the results of data integrity evaluations through the National Integrated Social and Economic Data (DTSEN) and field validation of welfare classifications based on economic deciles. Of this total, 5,090,334 participants were deactivated

because they were not recorded in the DTSEN. In comparison, 2,306,943 participants belonged to the socioeconomic deciles 6 to 10, which, according to socioeconomic indicators, are no longer considered part of the poor or vulnerable population.(Kemensos, 2025)

Table 1. Distribution of Deactivation Based on Two Main Categories

Deactivation Category	Number of Participants	Percentage
Not registered in DTSN.	5.090.334	68 %
Registered but in deciles 6–10	2.306.943	32 %
Total	7.397.277	100 %

Source: TribunJateng.com (2025)

This policy aims to improve the efficiency of the state budget and ensure that government subsidies are only given to groups that meet objective criteria based on data. This is in line with the data-driven policy approach, which emphasizes the importance of evidence in the decision-making process. (Head, 2015). However, in practice, this policy has given rise to complex governance issues, especially when state administrative data does not fully reflect the actual socioeconomic conditions of citizens. Several regions have reported significant social impacts, such as in Central Java Province and Tasikmalaya City, where thousands of citizens claim to have lost access to health services without adequate notification or understanding of why they were removed from the system. Furthermore, this policy demonstrates limitations in implementing the principles of transparency and public accountability. Not all affected citizens know they can access the reactivation mechanism through the Next Generation Social Welfare Information System (SIKS-NG) application, and even fewer have the administrative and digital capacity to use it effectively. This contradicts the principle of inclusivity in good governance, which requires access to information and meaningful participation in policy processes, especially for vulnerable groups. Thus, although this policy may be justified from a technocratic perspective, its process and implementation reveal deficits in social accountability and inequalities in access to administrative procedures. Data governance reform in social policy needs to consider that data validity is not only a product of information systems but also a reflection of the social and political relations that shape the data collection process. (Dunn, 2015).

The urgency of this research lies in the importance of dissecting data-based policies within the framework of democratic and responsive governance. Although digitization and social data integration are trends in bureaucratic reform, their implementation must be accompanied by methodological caution and socio-political sensitivity, so that the policies designed do not create access inequalities, but truly reach the groups most in need. Amidst the proliferation of significant data-based policies and digital information systems, critical reflection on how the state builds social justice through data verification processes is becoming increasingly important to examine. This research is expected to contribute theoretically to the discourse on social governance and provide practical input for policymakers to improve the design and implementation of social assistance programs in the future.

II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Literature on social policy governance in Indonesia tends to be based on a normative approach to good governance that encompasses the principles of transparency, accountability, participation, effectiveness, and responsiveness. (UNDP, 2017) This approach is often used as the primary reference in assessing the success or failure of public policies, including in the social protection sector. However, most studies still stop describing these principles' application without delving deeply into contextual issues such as institutional capacity, power dynamics, and implementation limitations at the local level. This results in much of the literature being overly idealistic and detached from reality, failing to explain the variations in policy implementation adequately. For example, some studies assess the effectiveness of social security policies solely through bureaucratic performance indicators, without considering fiscal disparities between regions, social structural diversity, or local politics, which are critical determinants of the success of programs like PBI-

JKN. This criticism aligns with the approach (Grindle, 2004) in the concept of good enough governance, which emphasizes that not all governance principles must be fulfilled ideally to achieve policy improvement. Grindle stresses the importance of understanding the limitations of the political context and bureaucratic capacity and encouraging selective and prioritized reforms. In other words, literature that overly idealizes good governance risks ignoring the structural realities faced by policy implementers, especially in developing countries such as Indonesia. In the context of the PBI-JKN deactivation policy, existing literature is still weak in highlighting how trade-offs between data efficiency and social justice occur in bureaucratic practice. The decision to deactivate millions of participants based on a digital system reflects technocratic rationalization thinking that has not been systematically criticized in academic studies. However, within the framework of good enough governance, data-driven policies need to be tested based on their accuracy and the extent to which they have a fair and proportional impact on vulnerable groups. The absence of such criticism in most of the literature creates a conceptual and empirical gap that needs to be bridged by new research.

Thus, this study takes a critical stance toward previous literature that is overly oriented toward ideal assumptions. A good enough governance approach has been chosen to develop a policy evaluation framework that is more adaptive to the realities of implementation, particularly in fiscal decentralization and the burden of local bureaucracy. This approach also examines how local governments navigate rigid and uniform central policies. This is where the original contribution of this research lies: it examines whether the principles of good governance are being implemented and to what extent these principles can be realistically implemented in complex and limited conditions.




Figure 1. Research Diagram

Regarding this framework, this study develops the hypothesis that the success or failure of the implementation of the PBI-JKN verification and deactivation policy is not determined solely by the perfection of the central system, but rather by the adaptive capacity of local governments in implementing the principle of good enough governance under their respective limitations and local contexts.

III. Research Method

This study uses a qualitative approach with a policy study type that analyzes the implementation and governance of social data verification policies in the PBI-JKN program. Policy studies are applied qualitative research, aiming not only to understand social phenomena but also to provide solutions to practical government or policy issues. (Creswell, 2003). This approach was chosen to examine in depth the relationships between actors, institutional structures, and socio-political dynamics that shape the process of public policy-making and implementation. (Cairney, 2019). Data was collected through a documentation study of legislation, official data from the Ministry of Social Affairs, BPJS Kesehatan reports, publications from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), and credible online media reports on the implementation of the policy to deactivate PBI-JKN participants at the national and regional levels. Additionally, a literature review was conducted on relevant scientific articles as a conceptual foundation, particularly those addressing governance, social exclusion, and the validity of policy data.

The analysis was conducted using content analysis techniques, enabling researchers to systematically interpret policy documents and public narratives to identify patterns of power relations, coordination mechanisms across actors, and indicators of good governance such as transparency, participation, and accountability. (Mayring, 2014). To strengthen the validity of the findings, data source triangulation was conducted by comparing official documents, media reports, and academic studies to obtain a comprehensive understanding that is scientifically accountable. (Subakti et al., 2023). With this methodology, the study is expected to critically explain how the policy of deactivating PBI-JKN participants is managed and how the policy reflects or contradicts the principles of good governance.

IV. Results and Discussion

4.1. The Role of Actors, Governance Implementation, and Policy Impact

The Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs' policy to deactivate PBI-JKN in 2025 is a response to social assistance data reform directives emphasizing the accuracy and efficiency of benefit distribution based on the National Socioeconomic Integrated Data (DTSEN). Within the ideal governance framework, this policy should be implemented through strong cross-sectoral coordination and principles of good governance such as transparency, accountability, and participation. However, in practice, the distribution of roles among stakeholders shows a pattern that is not yet fully synchronized. The Ministry of Social Affairs is the leading data manager and decision-maker in deactivating participants. BPJS Kesehatan plays an administrative role in the JKN membership system, while Dukcapil contributes to the validation of population data. On the other hand, local governments, as field implementers and public service providers, are in a reactive position to these top-down policies. The impact of this policy can be seen in cases where some regions have experienced a surge in participant deactivation. The following table provides an overview of the affected areas and the responses of local governments:

Table 2. Data on the Number of Areas Affected by Policies in East Java Province

Regency	Number of Deactivated Participants	Local Government Response	Source
Semarang	21.158	Allocation of Rp6.3 billion from the regional budget; proposal to reactivate thousands of participants	TribunJateng.com (2025)
Demak	± 41.000	Services through PBI-APBD and village budget sharing, anticipating the impact of UHC	RadarKudus.jawapos.com (2025)
Wonogiri	27.914	Manual re-registration and appeal for independent BPJS re-registration	SoloPos.com (2025); Diskominfo Wonogiri

Source: Processed by the author, 2025

Table 2 shows an imbalance in governance roles: national policies are formulated top-down, but local governments primarily bear implementation and responsibility. This situation indicates that the space for community and local government participation in the verification and reactivation process is still limited. Additionally, by mapping roles above, a pattern of policy burden distribution emerges: regions with good digital and social infrastructure (such as Semarang) can respond with rapid budget allocation. In contrast, other regions are forced to share costs due to limited resources and access to data inputs. This model shows that the principles of responsiveness and accountability in good governance theory are not yet evenly guaranteed, leading to significant differences in public services between regions.

Theoretically, a good governance model requires the equal involvement of all parties in the policy formulation and implementation process. When the distribution of roles is uneven, policy responses become uneven and highly dependent on fiscal capacity and the readiness of local bureaucracies. Local governments

with limited resources will find it challenging to meet the needs of affected residents, which ultimately creates disparities in public services between regions. (Dwiyanto, 2021). In this context, the principles of responsiveness and participation have not been fully implemented. Thus, the policy of deactivating PBI-JKN participants has revealed a disconnect between the digital data system and fair and adaptive institutional governance. Policy reformulation is needed, not only based on quantitative data but also considering the region's social, geographical, and institutional capacities in its implementation.

4.2. Implementation of Good Governance Principles in PBI-JKN Deactivation Policy

4.2.1. Transparency

Normatively, transparency requires openness of information that allows the public to access complete data and justifications for a policy. In the context of PBI-JKN deactivation, transparency is only partial: the Ministry of Social Affairs does disclose the number of participants who have been deactivated, but does not explain in detail the mechanism, criteria for removal, and revalidation used. This lack of openness makes it difficult for external parties, such as NGOs, academics, and even local governments, to exercise social control over the potential exclusionary effects of the policy. In good governance theory, such openness is crucial to avoid "black box policy-making," where decisions are made without public oversight. (UNDP, 1996). The absence of a public data dashboard or portal for tracking PBI recipients reflects weak institutional transparency at the central level. This reinforces the centralization of information and can potentially weaken the legitimacy of policies in the eyes of the public and local governments, which are the technical implementers.

4.2.2. Participant

Participation does not only mean the involvement of the community as the object of data collection, but also as active subjects in policy formulation, monitoring, and evaluation. However, this policy has no consultation mechanisms or participatory forums for the affected communities, either in the DTSEN decile classification process or when membership is revoked. The community is only given the option of individual reactivation, which in practice is difficult to implement due to limited access, digital literacy, and bureaucratic delays. The absence of public participation in this policy results in it being implemented in a technocratic, undemocratic manner. This contradicts the participatory principles outlined in the theory of deliberative governance, which emphasizes the importance of co-creation in public services. This situation creates a gap between policymakers and citizens, eliminating opportunities for collectively correcting systemic errors.

4.2.3. Accountability

Accountability in policy governance requires institutional accountability mechanisms that enable citizens to obtain clarity, raise objections, and monitor program implementation. There are no integrated, responsive, and independently monitored public complaint channels. Hence, complaints from deactivated participants depend solely on personal efforts to visit social services or sub-district offices. The absence of a transparent, recorded reporting and response system (e.g., a national complaint dashboard) renders accountability superficial and vertical. This indicates that accountability for PBI-JKN policy is more directed upward (administratively) than downward (toward citizens), which is theoretically referred to as "bureaucratic accountability," which has not yet entirely shifted to "citizen-centric accountability." (Dwiyanto, 2021). As a result, trust in the government regarding social security could decline significantly.

4.2.4. Responsiveness

Responsiveness measures the government's ability to respond quickly and appropriately to the needs and dynamics of society. In several regions, the reactivation system through the SIKS-NG application has

become the mainstay. However, this process has been hampered by structural issues such as digital inequality, a lack of human resources to assist with verification, and slow responses from relevant parties, including BPJS and regional social services agencies. Low responsiveness in reactivating PBI-JKN participants demonstrates that our bureaucracy's adaptive capacity remains weak, primarily when the digital systems relied upon are not supported by technical readiness at the local level. This reflects a vertical implementation gap between modern-digital national policies and the inconsistent social realities. Within the governance framework, responsiveness is an indicator of how well the system bridges the gap between "rational design" and "pragmatic adaptation" (Grindle, 2004).

4.3. The Impact of the Policy to Deactivate PBI JKN in the Regions


An in-depth analysis in Central Java shows that mass deactivation has substantially impacted access to health services, the achievement of UHC, and the socio-economic conditions of poor and vulnerable people.

Table 3. Data on the Impact and Implications of Policies in the Region

Region	Participant Deactivated	Impact on Society	Implications of Regional Policy
Semarang	21.158	Concrete example: Single mothers and children with disabilities lose BPJS coverage, threatening the continuity of their chronic treatment	The local government has allocated Rp 5–6.3 billion to pay contributions and has reactivated dozens of cases.
Demak	± 41.000	Nearly 98% of patients use BPJS; 60% of them are PBI—deactivation threatens UHC achievement and limits access for poor/chronically ill patients.	The local government covers contributions from the regional and village budgets, plans cost sharing, and estimates a need for Rp 10 billion for 24,000 participants over 6 months.
Wonogiri	27.914	Banyak pasien dengan penyakit katastrofik dinonaktifkan dan kesulitan akses layanan BPJS; risiko kesehatan masyarakat rendah tinggi	The social services agency has opened a hybrid reactivation counter, corrected NIKs, and prioritized critical cases with a response time of two weeks.

Source: Processed by the author, 2025

Based on Table 3, it can be seen that this policy could disrupt several elements. Deactivation disrupts continuity of access, especially for vulnerable patients (single mothers, people with disabilities, and patients with catastrophic conditions). In Demak, deactivating 41,000 participants can potentially reduce UHC coverage from 98% and create service gaps. The swift response from local governments, such as the allocation of Rp 5–6.3 billion in Semarang and Rp 10 billion in Demak, indicates that the cost burden has been transferred to the regions. This raises questions about the sustainability of the regional budget and the need for cost-sharing, especially in low-income areas. There is a tendency toward social exclusion: people with low incomes risk losing services without immediate local intervention (revalidation, reactivation). The digital system (SIKS-NG) cannot reach those deactivated without on-site assistance. Local responses are ad hoc and depend on human resource capacity, budget, and information systems. Wonogiri demonstrates a good hybrid response, but not all regions have similar readiness. From these issues, it can be concluded that the deactivation of PBI-JKN has real consequences in the form of disrupted access to healthcare and local fiscal pressure. The emergence of reactivation schemes and emergency budgets in regions is an ad-hoc response, not part of the central policy design. Implementation disparities lead to variations in service quality and the potential for increased social inequality between regions.



Graphics 1. Comparison of fund allocation and the number of participants affected

Graph 1 shows a comparison between regional budget allocations (in billions of rupiah) and the number of PBI-JKN participants affected by the 2025 deactivation policy in three priority study areas: Semarang City, Demak Regency, and Wonogiri Regency. This visualization illustrates policy dynamics at the local level in response to a uniform national decision. Semarang allocated approximately Rp6.3 billion from the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) as compensation for the deactivation of 21,158 participants. This fiscal response demonstrates the city government's concrete efforts to maintain the continuity of health services, especially for vulnerable groups not directly covered by the national program. Semarang is also selectively reactivating participants, prioritizing cases such as chronic patients and children with disabilities. Meanwhile, Demak Regency faces greater challenges with a total of 41,000 participants deactivated, most of whom are poor residents who previously relied heavily on BPJS PBI. The Demak local government has allocated Rp 10 billion over the next six months. This funding will finance PBI-APBD services and a cost-sharing scheme between the regency and villages. The high number of affected participants and the significant funding allocation indicate that Demak has been severely impacted fiscally and socially by this policy. Unlike the two regions, Wonogiri District recorded a significantly higher number of affected participants, reaching approximately 100,000 individuals (27,914 families). However, no explicit data is available regarding the size of the local budget allocation to address the surge in inactive participants. This is why there is no budget allocation for Wonogiri in the previous graph, as valid and verified fiscal information has not been available in the media or official reports. Despite this, the Wonogiri Regency Government has taken several responsive measures, such as opening online and offline reactivation counters and conducting a re-registration process through a hybrid system.

The problem with the policy of deactivating 7.39 million PBI-JKN participants does not lie solely in the validity of the data or administrative decisions, but rather in the imbalance of capacity in its implementation. The central government has prioritized a technocratic approach based on data systems and population matching algorithms to screen out participants who no longer meet the requirements. Although this policy normatively reflects the principles of efficiency and accuracy, in practice, it has resulted in new symptoms of social exclusion, especially for poor groups who are not administratively registered but are still very much in need of state protection. When this policy is implemented at the local level, such as in Semarang, Demak, and Wonogiri, various responses show that regions must address complexities not covered by the national system. From emergency APBD allocations to the establishment of manual reactivation services, it is clear that the success of implementation depends more on the adaptability of local governments than on the perfection of the central system. This aligns with the theory of Good Enough Governance developed by Marlie. (Grindle, 2004). In this framework, Grindle emphasizes that not all principles of good governance can or should be applied simultaneously in developing countries. Instead, bureaucratic reform must be oriented toward realistic, contextual priorities that directly impact improving the welfare of the people. In this case, the policy of deactivating PBI-JKN can be seen as an example of the failure of a one-size-fits-all approach in social

governance systems. Grindle warns that governance that places too much emphasis on procedural perfection often overlooks the practical needs of the people at the grassroots level. He states:

"Governance reforms should not be guided by the ideal of what a good government should look like, but by what is 'good enough' to allow poverty reduction and development goals to be achieved." (Grindle, 2004)

This context shows that Indonesia needs to redesign its social policies with the logic of good enough governance, which means building a precise data system and ensuring that the system remains inclusive, flexible, and capable of accommodating dynamic social conditions. The government must adjust bureaucratic reforms in line with the actual capacity of institutions and social structures, by providing space for community participation and adequate institutional support in the regions.

V. Conclusion

The Ministry of Social Affairs' policy to deactivate 7.39 million PBI-JKN participants in 2025 opens a new chapter in social policy governance practices in Indonesia. On the one hand, this policy reflects the spirit of efficiency and data accuracy in digital-based public services. On the other hand, its implementation has led to social exclusion of poor and vulnerable groups affected by the policy without sufficient transitional protection or participatory channels. Fiscal and institutional capacity disparities at the local level, as seen in Semarang, Demak, and Wonogiri, reveal that the policy's success is highly influenced by local capacity to respond adaptively to social crises. In this context, the theory of Good Enough Governance proposed by Marlie S. Grindle (2004) becomes highly relevant. Grindle emphasizes that in developing countries, reforms do not need to demand the fulfillment of all principles of good governance in an ideal manner, but rather focus on achieving realistic improvements with direct impact. Thus, the evaluation of the PBI-JKN policy should not only assess the extent to which the principles of transparency or accountability are implemented, but also examine how contextual, inclusive, and feasible the policy is in the framework of the actual capacity of local governments. The results of this study confirm that a technocratic and centralized approach to social decision-making is not yet entirely in line with the reality of local bureaucracy. Local governments that have taken the initiative to allocate budgets and open channels for reactivation demonstrate that local adaptation is crucial in ensuring access to health insurance. Therefore, future policy formulation must adopt the "good enough governance" logic, prioritizing context-appropriate solutions, responsiveness to vulnerable groups, and enabling phased and measurable implementation in line with institutional capacity. With this approach, social policies will not only be more humane and fairer but also more effective and sustainable, as they are built on the foundation of cross-actor engagement and awareness of the structural limitations of the state. This research is expected to contribute to the discourse on data-driven social policy governance in Indonesia and serve as a policy reference for achieving an inclusive and adaptive social security system in the future.

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